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A Monthly Column by EFAP Director John Yinger 
March/April 2006 
Eliminating STAR’s Unintended Consequences 
As discussed in a previous column (June 2005), New York’s School Tax Relief Program, STAR, has many 
unintended consequences.  These consequences include higher school tax rates and higher school-district 
inefficiency.  This column presents a simple reform that would minimize these unintended consequences.  
 
The existence of these unintended consequences is now widely acknowledged.  A recent report by the New 
York State Comptroller, for example, argues that 
 
While STAR indisputably provides property tax relief for those receiving it, its long-term impact may 
well be an overall increase in State and local taxes… By reducing the local tax share paid for greater 
school spending, STAR actually provides an incentive to increase school spending.1 
 
The link between STAR and the “local share paid for greater school spending” exists because STAR is based on 
a school district’s actual property tax rate.  If the school district raises its tax rate, it receives a larger STAR 
reimbursement.  The perverse incentives in STAR can be cut back, therefore, by breaking this link. 
 
The extensions of STAR proposed by Governor Pataki and the New York State Legislature suggest a simple 
way to break this link and eliminate these unintended consequences.  These extensions call for school property 
tax rebates to be sent directly to homeowners instead of to school districts, as are the basic STAR payments. 
  
As discussed in my January 2006 column, these extensions magnify the price subsidy in the basic STAR 
program and therefore give voters additional incentive to raise their local property tax rates.  This additional 
incentive could be eliminated by re-designing these rebates so that they are based on the average school 
property tax rate in the state the previous year instead of on a homeowner’s actual school tax rate.  With this 
approach, the rebates have no impact on the amount a homeowner must pay for an increase in school 
spending—and therefore do nothing to encourage boosts in school spending and tax rates.2   
 
Moreover, this approach could be used to eliminate the price incentives in STAR altogether.  Currently, STAR 
requires a homestead exemption for homeowners and compensates districts for the resulting lost property tax 
revenue.  By changing this exemption/compensation system into rebates given directly to homeowners and 
basing all rebates on the statewide average tax rate (not the actual rate in the homeowner’s district), the link 
between STAR and the “local share paid for greater school spending” could be completely broken.   
                                                 
1   http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/pubs/research/propertytaxes.pdf. 
 
2  The Governor’s version limits rebates to homeowners in school districts that keep their annual school spending increase below a 
specified cap.  As discussed in my previous column, this is an unfair way to minimize STAR’s unintended consequences.  The 
approach presented here would be fairer and more effective. As of this writing, it is not clear whether STAR rebates will be 













Suppose the state-wide average tax rate is 2 percent of market value.  Then a typical district would receive a 
payment from the state equal to (.02)($30,000) = $600 for each homeowner, regardless of the actual school 
property tax rate in the district.  With the new 30 percent STAR extension, this payment would be 
(.02)($30,000)(1.3) = $780.  The payments would be higher for low-income elderly homeowners, of course, and 
would be higher in counties where the sales price differential factor boosts the STAR exemption above $30,000 
(unless this unfair provision is repealed—as it should be!). 
 
The reform proposed here would eliminate the price subsidy built into STAR but it would not completely 
eliminate the impact of STAR on local voters.  Rebates do give homeowners more disposable income and 
therefore increase their demand for many things, including education.  Nevertheless, many studies find that the 
impact of a change in disposable income on the demand for education is small, and switching to these rebates 
would dramatically lower the impact of STAR on school tax rates. 
 
This reform also would add an element of fairness to STAR.  Under its current design, STAR provides greater 
compensation to districts that set higher property tax rates, even if those rates are high because of the districts’ 
wasteful spending practices.  If STAR rebates were based on a statewide average school tax rate, homeowners 
in inefficient districts would receive the same rebates as anyone else. 
 
In addition, this reform could easily be extended to renters, which would also improve STAR’s fairness.  For 
example, under the assumption that renters pay 20 percent of the property tax on their apartment buildings in 
the form of higher rent, an estimate supported by some recent research, STAR rebate checks to renters could be 
set at (.02)($30,000)(.2) = $120 [or (.02)($30,000)(1.3)(.2) = $156 with the recent extension.]  
 
It is profoundly ironic that the School Tax Relief program has resulted in large school tax rate increases across 
New York State.  These tax rate increases have offset one-third or more of the initial STAR property tax savings 
for homeowners and they have raised property taxes by 20 percent or more on commercial and industrial 
property.  These effects arise because STAR lowers the impact of tax increases on local voters.  These effects 
could be eliminated by (1) transforming all STAR subsidies into rebates given directly to homeowners and (2) 
basing these rebates on the state-wide average school property tax rate, not the actual rate in a homeowner’s 
school district. 
